Pluralismo ontologico e ontologia della sostanza La critica di Putnam alla tesi quineana sull’indeterminatezza della traduzione

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journal	RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA
issue	RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA - 2020 - 1
title	Pluralismo ontologico e ontologia della sostanza La critica di Putnam alla tesi quineana sull’indeterminatezza della traduzione Ontological Pluralism and Ontology of the Substance. Putnam’s Criticism on Quinean Thesis of the Indeterminacy of Translation
author	Antonio Lizzadri
publisher	Vita e Pensiero
format	Article \| Pdf
online since	05-2020
doi	10.26350/001050_000138
issn	00356247 (print) \| 18277926 (digital)
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Description Readers' comments
The paper provides an interpretation of Putnam’s ontological pluralism as articulated in the Philosophical Papers and The Meaning and the Moral Sciences, with respect especially to Quine’s ontological relativity. The model-theoretic argument is usually taken to support an anti-realist ontological view analogous to Quine’s, on which determining the meaning of words univocally is impossible. Contrary to this view, the paper argues that Putnam’s criticism of the indeterminacy of translation shows that the rejection of metaphysical realism does not amount to an anti-realist view. Rather, Putnam proposes a ‘sophisitcated’ realism admitting of a plurality of equivalent and mutually irreducible descriptions of the same fact. The paper concludes by pointing out that the compatibility between ontological pluralism and realism is the result of a synthesis of Aristotelianism and Kantianism obtained thanks to the mediation of pragmatism. keywords Ontological Pluralism, Realism, Indeterminacy of translation, Holism, Pragmatism Author biography antonio.lizzadri@unicatt.it Enter a comment for Pluralismo ontologico e ontologia della sostanza La critica di Putnam alla tesi quineana sull’indeterminatezza della traduzione

Description Readers' comments

The paper provides an interpretation of Putnam’s ontological pluralism as articulated in the Philosophical Papers and The Meaning and the Moral Sciences, with respect especially to Quine’s ontological relativity. The model-theoretic argument is usually taken to support an anti-realist ontological view analogous to Quine’s, on which determining the meaning of words univocally is impossible. Contrary to this view, the paper argues that Putnam’s criticism of the indeterminacy of translation shows that the rejection of metaphysical realism does not amount to an anti-realist view. Rather, Putnam proposes a ‘sophisitcated’ realism admitting of a plurality of equivalent and mutually irreducible descriptions of the same fact. The paper concludes by pointing out that the compatibility between ontological pluralism and realism is the result of a synthesis of Aristotelianism and Kantianism obtained thanks to the mediation of pragmatism.