À rebours: dal Sofista a Parmenide. Platone tra «corrispondenza» e «identità»

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Article

journal	RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA
issue	RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA - 2020 - 1
title	À rebours: dal Sofista a Parmenide. Platone tra «corrispondenza» e «identità» From Sophist to Parmenides. Plato between «Correspondence» and «Identity»
author	Erminia Di Iulio
publisher	Vita e Pensiero
format	Article \| Pdf
online since	05-2020
doi	10.26350/001050_000172
issn	00356247 (print) \| 18277926 (digital)
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Description Readers' comments
This paper aims to develop an answer to a twofold question: in the Sophist, what does the aporetic notion of falsehood amount to, from a theoretical point of view? And, consequently, how can be theoretically defined the concept of truth Plato is rejecting in order to provide a new account of truth (and falsehood)? The two questions are, in fact, deeply related. Thus, the strategy will be as follows: firstly, the Plato’s «not-being as difference» account employed to solve the «ontological falsehood» puzzle will be recalled and its consequences examined; secondly, an analysis of the correspondence theory of truth Plato seems to endorse in the Sophist will be provided; finally, a suggestion concerning the theoretical nature of Eleatic account of truth – i.e. the account Plato is questioning – will be made. keywords Plato, Sophist, Truth, Correspondence, Identity Author biography Università degli Studi di Roma “Tor Vergata”. Email: erminia.di.iulio@uniroma2.it Enter a comment for À rebours: dal Sofista a Parmenide. Platone tra «corrispondenza» e «identità»

Description Readers' comments

This paper aims to develop an answer to a twofold question: in the Sophist, what does the aporetic notion of falsehood amount to, from a theoretical point of view? And, consequently, how can be theoretically defined the concept of truth Plato is rejecting in order to provide a new account of truth (and falsehood)? The two questions are, in fact, deeply related. Thus, the strategy will be as follows: firstly, the Plato’s «not-being as difference» account employed to solve the «ontological falsehood» puzzle will be recalled and its consequences examined; secondly, an analysis of the correspondence theory of truth Plato seems to endorse in the Sophist will be provided; finally, a suggestion concerning the theoretical nature of Eleatic account of truth – i.e. the account Plato is questioning – will be made.