I Sentimenti morali in Descartes e Spinoza Il caso di pietà e invidia, favore e indignazione

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journal	RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA
issue	RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA - 2020 - 2. Ethica e Passions de l’âme Spinoza con e contro Descartes
title	I Sentimenti morali in Descartes e Spinoza Il caso di pietà e invidia, favore e indignazione Moral Feelings in Descartes and Spinoza. The Case of Pity and Envy, Favor and Indignation
author	Francesco Toto
publisher	Vita e Pensiero
format	Article \| Pdf
online since	07-2020
doi	10.26350/001050_000164
issn	00356247 (print) \| 18277926 (digital)
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Description Readers' comments
The article compares Descartes’ and Spinoza’s theory of passions through an analysis of their treatment of pity or commiseration, envy, favor and indignation. By analyzing these affects, the article seeks to accomplish two objectives. on the one hand, it aims to show that complexities of the relationship between Spinoza’s Ethica and Descartes’s Passions de l’ame are ignored if the latter is considered simply as a polemical target of the former. on the other hand, it aims to clarify how Spinoza, starting from anthropological premises opposed to Descartes’, can present a model of a strong or generous man that has many elements in common Descartes’. keywords Descartes, Spinoza, passions, morality Author biography Università degli Studi “Roma tre”. email: francesco.toto@uniroma3.it Enter a comment for I Sentimenti morali in Descartes e Spinoza Il caso di pietà e invidia, favore e indignazione

Description Readers' comments

The article compares Descartes’ and Spinoza’s theory of passions through an analysis of their treatment of pity or commiseration, envy, favor and indignation. By analyzing these affects, the article seeks to accomplish two objectives. on the one hand, it aims to show that complexities of the relationship between Spinoza’s Ethica and Descartes’s Passions de l’ame are ignored if the latter is considered simply as a polemical target of the former. on the other hand, it aims to clarify how Spinoza, starting from anthropological premises opposed to Descartes’, can present a model of a strong or generous man that has many elements in common Descartes’.