The Riddle of Objectivity. Objectivity Assumptions as Internal Presuppositions

newdigital The Riddle of Objectivity.
Objectivity Assumptions as Internal Presuppositions

Article

journal	RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA
issue	RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA - 2020 - 3. Rethinking Objectivity: With and Beyond Kant
title	The Riddle of Objectivity. Objectivity Assumptions as Internal Presuppositions
author	Günter Abel
publisher	Vita e Pensiero
format	Article \| Pdf
online since	12-2020
doi	10.26350/001050_000212
issn	00356247 (print) \| 18277926 (digital)
Write a comment for this product

€ 6.00

Ebook format Pdf readable on these devices:

Computer
with Software:
- Adobe PDF Reader
Android
iPhone/Ipad
with App:
- Adobe PDF Reader
E-Book Reader
Ibs Tolino
Kobo

Description Readers' comments
The two leading questions of this paper are: How do we have to conceive objectivity, and where does the normativity of objectivity come from? These are challenging questions because the traditional reservoirs that are required to answer them (like, e.g., ontological metaphysics and universalism) are no longer at our disposal the way they used to be. On one side the idea of objectivity plays a highly important role in our triangular I-We/You-World relations. On the other side, objectivity seems to be highly elusive and hard to grasp. The leading thesis of this paper is that we can solve the riddle of objectivity by conceiving our objectivity assumptions as internal presuppositions of our human experience, perception, speech, thought, and action. Given that this new conception of objectivity must integrate the temporal and processual nature of what counts as an object and an objectivity, we face the crucial desideratum of developing a dynamic model of objectivity. keywords Objectivity, Subjectivity, Presuppositions, Dichotomy of Subjectivism and Objectivism, Objectivity and Objectivation Author biography Technische Universität Berlin – Institut für Philosophie / Innovationszentrum Wissensforschung (IZW). Email: abel@tu-berlin.de Enter a comment for The Riddle of Objectivity. Objectivity Assumptions as Internal Presuppositions

Description Readers' comments

The two leading questions of this paper are: How do we have to conceive objectivity, and where does the normativity of objectivity come from? These are challenging questions because the traditional reservoirs that are required to answer them (like, e.g., ontological metaphysics and universalism) are no longer at our disposal the way they used to be. On one side the idea of objectivity plays a highly important role in our triangular I-We/You-World relations. On the other side, objectivity seems to be highly elusive and hard to grasp. The leading thesis of this paper is that we can solve the riddle of objectivity by conceiving our objectivity assumptions as internal presuppositions of our human experience, perception, speech, thought, and action. Given that this new conception of objectivity must integrate the temporal and processual nature of what counts as an object and an objectivity, we face the crucial desideratum of developing a dynamic model of objectivity.