Meinongian Empty Singular Terms - Alberto Voltolini - Vita e Pensiero - Articolo Filosofia Neo-Scolastica Vita e Pensiero

Meinongian Empty Singular Terms

newdigital Meinongian Empty Singular Terms
issue RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA - 2021 - 4. Alexius Meinong and His Contemporaries
title Meinongian Empty Singular Terms
Publisher Vita e Pensiero
format Article | Pdf
online since 03-2022
doi 10.26350/001050_000308
issn 0035-6247 (print) | 1827-7926 (digital)
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As is well known, in On Denoting Russell charged Meinong with the accusation of erroneously taking any term grammatically sounding as a singular term as a term that refers to something. In this paper, I want to show that this  accusation is wrong. Definitely, for Meinong many, possibly most, singular terms that most philosophers would consider to be empty do refer to something. Yet for him, and for (Neo-)Meinongians more in general, given the principles  of object determination they stuck to as relevant for how one thinks of objects, it is quite possible that there are (though relatively few) empty singular terms.


Meinong; Thesis of Universal Reference; Characterization Postulate; Principle of the Freedom of Assumption; Strenghtened and Refined Principle of the Freedom of Assumption

Author biography

Università degli Studi di Torino. Email: