Critica dello psicologismo e determinazioni ideali. Edmund Husserl e l’astrazione ideante

newdigital Critica dello psicologismo e determinazioni ideali.
Edmund Husserl e l’astrazione ideante

Article

journal	RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA
issue	RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA - 2022 - 1
title	Critica dello psicologismo e determinazioni ideali. Edmund Husserl e l’astrazione ideante Criticism of Psychologism and Ideal Determinations. Edmund Husserl and the Idealizing Abstraction
Author	Giacomo Borbone
Publisher	Vita e Pensiero
format	Article \| Pdf
online since	05-2022
doi	10.26350/001050_000317
issn	0035-6247 (print) \| 1827-7926 (digital)
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Description Readers' comments
In this contribution I will examine a particular aspect of Husserl’s thought, but not for this reason simply accessory, which concerns, in particular, the formation of scientific concepts in the light of his phenomenological approach. The first part is devoted to Husserl’s criticism of psychologism and empirical abstraction; the second to ideal concepts while in the third part I will try to reflect on the reasons that led Husserl to the ‘abrupt interruption’ of that path that he had fruitfully undertaken and that led him to consider the formation of scientific concepts essentially based on idealizing procedures that constantly transcend the sensitive data. keywords Edmund Husserl, Eidetic Reduction, Gradual Concretization, Idealizing Abstraction, Lebenswelt Author biography Università degli Studi di Catania. Email: giacomoborbone@yahoo.it Enter a comment for Critica dello psicologismo e determinazioni ideali. Edmund Husserl e l’astrazione ideante

Description Readers' comments

In this contribution I will examine a particular aspect of Husserl’s thought, but not for this reason simply accessory, which concerns, in particular, the formation of scientific concepts in the light of his phenomenological approach. The first part is devoted to Husserl’s criticism of psychologism and empirical abstraction; the second to ideal concepts while in the third part I will try to reflect on the reasons that led Husserl to the ‘abrupt interruption’ of that path that he had fruitfully undertaken and that led him to consider the formation of scientific concepts essentially based on idealizing procedures that constantly transcend the sensitive data.