The Relationship between Introspection and Folk Psychology: An Overview

digital

Article

journal	RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA
issue	RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA - 2021 - 3
title	The Relationship between Introspection and Folk Psychology: An Overview
Author	Giuseppe Lo Dico
Publisher	Vita e Pensiero
format	Article \| Pdf
online since	10-2021
doi	10.26350/001050_000285
issn	0035-6247 (print) \| 1827-7926 (digital)
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Description Readers' comments
The epistemic status of introspection remains a controversial topic. Due to its subjective character, introspection is not an easy fit with natural sciences or a physicalistic picture of the mind. In literature, introspection is conceived as dealing only with macro-cognition and not with micro-cognition, the supposed object of study of scientific psychology. This essay discusses the epistemic status of introspection in light of its relationship with folk psychology and spells it out through an analysis of the positions of Wilkes, Alston, Schwitzgebel, and Churchland. Specifically, the essay makes a distinction between folk and scientific psychology and addresses the issue of the incorrigibility/infallibility of introspective judgments. The essay endorses a view according to which introspection should be conceived as a cognitive process the contents of which are provided by folk knowledge. It shows how this view can be appreciated as scientific, provided that a physicalistic image of the mind is rejected. keywords Introspection, Folk Psychology, Scientific Psychology, Natural Sciences, Human Sciences Author biography Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milano. Email: giuseppe.lodico@unicatt.it Enter a comment for The Relationship between Introspection and Folk Psychology: An Overview

Description Readers' comments

The epistemic status of introspection remains a controversial topic. Due to its subjective character, introspection is not an easy fit with natural sciences or a physicalistic picture of the mind. In literature, introspection is conceived as dealing only with macro-cognition and not with micro-cognition, the supposed object of study of scientific psychology. This essay discusses the epistemic status of introspection in light of its relationship with folk psychology and spells it out through an analysis of the positions of Wilkes, Alston, Schwitzgebel, and Churchland. Specifically, the essay makes a distinction between folk and scientific psychology and addresses the issue of the incorrigibility/infallibility of introspective judgments. The essay endorses a view according to which introspection should be conceived as a cognitive process the contents of which are provided by folk knowledge. It shows how this view can be appreciated as scientific, provided that a physicalistic image of the mind is rejected.