Two Finean Arguments Reconsidered

newdigital Two Finean Arguments Reconsidered

Article

journal	RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA
issue	RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA - 2022 - 1
title	Two Finean Arguments Reconsidered
Author	Marco Larotonda
Publisher	Vita e Pensiero
format	Article \| Pdf
online since	05-2022
doi	10.26350/001050_000313
issn	0035-6247 (print) \| 1827-7926 (digital)
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Description Readers' comments
According to Classical Extensional Mereology, ordinary objects are unstructured. But our intuitions guide us in the opposite direction; ordinary objects (such as sandwiches, tables, and chairs) have their parts arranged in a precise way. Some philosophers take this thought as a decisive reason to find Classical Extensional Mereology inadequate to account for ordinary objects. Indeed, the two arguments (the Aggregative Objection and the Monster Objection) that Kit Fine presents in his paper Things and Their Parts, purports to show that Classical Extensional Mereology does not correctly represent the conditions of existence of ordinary objects. In this paper, I provide a detailed critique of the Finean objections in order to argue that we can continue to employ Classical Extensional Mereology for the analysis of ordinary objects. keywords Analytic Metaphysics, Mereology, Classical Extensional Mereology, Parthood, Ordinary Objects Author biography Università degli Studi di Milano. Email: marco.larotonda@studenti.unimi.it Enter a comment for Two Finean Arguments Reconsidered

Description Readers' comments

According to Classical Extensional Mereology, ordinary objects are unstructured. But our intuitions guide us in the opposite direction; ordinary objects (such as sandwiches, tables, and chairs) have their parts arranged in a precise way. Some philosophers take this thought as a decisive reason to find Classical Extensional Mereology inadequate to account for ordinary objects. Indeed, the two arguments (the Aggregative Objection and the Monster Objection) that Kit Fine presents in his paper Things and Their Parts, purports to show that Classical Extensional Mereology does not correctly represent the conditions of existence of ordinary objects. In this paper, I provide a detailed critique of the Finean objections in order to argue that we can continue to employ Classical Extensional Mereology for the analysis of ordinary objects.