Immanuel Kant’s project for a critique of reason exhibits a foundation that has an avowedly not despotic profile. This is to say that the sense in which Kant speaks of reason as a faculty of principles appears to be intimately connected with the idea that ‘principle’, in a strict sense, can only be said of what does not escape the critical opinion and autonomy of thought that such a judgment necessarily involves. The strictly political form of government that is applied, according to Kant, to the authority of reason as exercise of non-despotic power affords a privileged point of view from which to reread, in not necessarily antagonistic terms, a widespread image in contemporary debate – that is, Kant torn between a revolutionary spirit and a reformist profile.
In Gadamer’s view, every translation, even the literal one, is an interpretation; thus every translator is an interpreter. The translation is a model for hermeneutics and knowledge of hermeneutical experience or the event of understanding. This paper aims at examining how Gadamer’s hermeneutical insights can, in some way, act as a model for the process of translation. Therefore, the extent to which the principles and concepts of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics such as application, prejudice, play of understanding, effective history, and the fusion of horizons can be applied to the act and process of translation are discussed. One can argue, in the light of Gademer’s hermeneutics, that the act of translation is not only rendering words and sentences from one language into another, or it is not only the reconstruction of the author’s intention and her mental states as she was creating the work in the target language, but it is also the creation of a new world by calling the speakers of the target language to participate in the world.
The aim of the paper is to illustrate the fundamental principles of philosophy that Fichte elaborates in his Foundation of the Entire Doctrine of Science (1794-1795). Fichte’s theory of principles is constructed in the framework of his reception and discussion of Kant’s critique of reason. The confrontation with the «new skeptics» (Maimon and Schulze) plays also an essential role. The doctrine of science must propose the foundation of experience, intended as an act, or as an activity (Tathandlung), which founds the whole activity of consciousness and our experience of the world. However, the Tathandlung is not only a theoretical principle, which forms representations, butalso and above all a practical principle, since our experience consists not only of representations of objects, but also of representations of values and purposes. Here we are dealing with the practical moment that founds the theoretical moment according to the doctrine of science.
According to Classical Extensional Mereology, ordinary objects are unstructured. But our intuitions guide us in the opposite direction; ordinary objects (such as sandwiches, tables, and chairs) have their parts arranged in a precise way. Some philosophers take this thought as a decisive reason to find Classical Extensional Mereology inadequate to account for ordinary objects. Indeed, the two arguments (the Aggregative Objection and the Monster Objection) that Kit Fine presents in his paper Things and Their Parts, purports to show that Classical Extensional Mereology does not correctly represent the conditions of existence of ordinary objects. In this paper, I provide a detailed critique of the Finean objections in order to argue that we can continue to employ Classical Extensional Mereology for the analysis of ordinary objects.
The paper presents an experiment run on the Index Thomisticus Treebank, the syntactically annotated portion of the corpus collecting the works of Thomas Aquinas. After an introduction about the theoretical background of the annotation style of the treebank, the process to extract from the corpus the information about a set of words concerning intellect and will in Summa contra Gentiles is described. Then, the paper details the automatic induction from the treebank of two kinds of syntactic networks whose vertices are words and edges represent their syntactic relations in the treebank. The networks are used in order to provide a synoptic view and grasp of data, to answer a set of questions about intellect and will in Summa contra Gentiles. Finally, the paper discusses some general conclusions about the use of textual data in philosophy, following its objective to represent an example of how intellectual questions can be turned into experiments whose results are replicable.
Inaugurating a new voyage leading to an appointment with evil means, for Marcel, taking apart the abstract forms of logic winding through western tradition. Paths that are as commonly trodden as they are incorporeal, which, when attempting to speak about evil as about any other problem, lose their concreteness without ever coming to a sincere encounter with it. Marcel accuses these approaches to open up a new phenomenological path which allows him to concretely come up against evil and talk about it in a different way. In addition to opening up for him the possibility of a close experience of evil, the phenomenology of evil offers Marcel a very powerful weapon for defusing the processes of removal or annulment of evil itself. Encountering evil means allowing evil to encounter us, but always existentially, without referring a priori to an abstract idea of it. Evil in flesh and blood, far removed from the evil in which ethical manoeuvres and intellectual or spiritual experiments bask, which are only apparently similar to evil but actually reveal a closure that removes or nullifies first-hand experience
This paper tries to show that, for Plato, man is unhappy «in many ways». Applying the model of multifocal approach also to one of the essential problems both of philosophy and of human existence, the paper crosses the multiple reasons of unhappiness. Unhappiness, in fact, can derive, for instance, from a life without a target to aim for, from a life suffering and crushed by pain, from lack of self control. More generally, furthermore, unhappiness can come from lack of measure, and can be the result of a vicious life. Unlike virtue, in fact, merely described as that which lends measure and order to all beings, making them good, vice denounces an incorrect working and is the principle of excess the foundation of disorder and disharmony of life, i.e. of unhappiness.
Whereas several researches have been devoted to Auriol’s philosophical and theological works in the last fifty years, Auriol’s sermons have been basically neglected. The aim of this paper is to partially fill this gap, by focusing on one of Auriol’s sermons: the so-called De Compassione Virginis Sermo. The main argument defended here is that, while put into poetic and rhetorical language, Auriol’s theological insights lose nothing of their theoretical sharpness. They rather acquire an unexpected clarity and power of persuasion, of which the De Compassione Virginis Sermo proves to be a remarkable example. In this regard, analyzing the formal structure of this sermon and examining the manner in which some of Auriol’s most notable tenets are presented there will provide an unusual, but still useful way to approach his rich thought.
In this article I analyze the attack that Gaetano Sanseverino moves against Spinza biblical interpretation. In particular Sanseverino criticizes the Spinoza’s conception of prophecy, revelation and miracles because he sees in it the origin of the rationalist exegesis of the sacred text. This type of exegesis, in fact, resolves the authentic divine inspiration of the Bible in its rationalist, anthropological or cultural genesis.
In this contribution I will examine a particular aspect of Husserl’s thought, but not for this reason simply accessory, which concerns, in particular, the formation of scientific concepts in the light of his phenomenological approach. The first part is devoted to Husserl’s criticism of psychologism and empirical abstraction; the second to ideal concepts while in the third part I will try to reflect on the reasons that led Husserl to the ‘abrupt interruption’ of that path that he had fruitfully undertaken and that led him to consider the formation of scientific concepts essentially based on idealizing procedures that constantly transcend the sensitive data.
As a first step, the purpose of this paper is to briefly show how within the theoretical perspective of Piero Martinetti, the conclusions gained in animal psychology’s research are a necessary starting point and essential element of the development of his ethical position. Subsequently the moral discourse on non-human animals will be directly connected with the philosopher’s broader theoretical horizon, both gnoseological and moral, and it will be shown how his animal ethics fits coherently in this framework. Schopenhauer will be an essential point of reference for the discussion, also considering its importance for the entire philosophy of Martinetti. Some more theoretical reflections close the paper, developed also in the light of the contemporary debate about animal ethics.
This paper deals with Walter Jaeschke’s Hegels Philosophie. It begins with Hegel’s early writings, focusing on the relationship between logic and metaphysics. It goes on to explore central moments of Hegel’s philosophy: the relationship with Kant, the nature of categories, the philosophy of history, the concept of the State. Jaeschke’s interpretation of Hegel’s thought is that of a paradigmatic thinker, whose fundamental philosophical breakthrough lies in the concept of Geist.
The aim of this essay is to examine recent contributions to Schelling research that appeared in three miscellanies in 2020. Their common thread is Schelling’s philosophy of nature, which, because of its dynamic and processual characteristics, is considered relevant in the debate on realism, philosophy of biology and environmental ethics. In the historical- philosophical field, many contributions highlight Schelling’s debt to Kant and Spinoza and his close relationship with the Romantic movement. Lastly, the essay analyses contributions concerning the Spätphilosophie, showing how Schelling’s philosophy is to be considered first and foremost as historical philosophy.
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