In this essay, the author first reconstructs the goal setting and initial assumptions, starting from which the well-known reformist Catholic theologian Hans Küng strives in the tradition of the so-called «Physico-theological evidence» to argue in favor of the existence of God. At the same time, the key topic is the topic of fundamental trust in reality in relation to which the dilemma of worldview atheism or theism is formed. The author pays special attention to explaining the specific internal rationality of fundamental theistic trust in Küng’s interpretation. In further consideration, three possibilities of interpretation or reinterpretation of Küng’s central thesis are presented. Still, at the same time, certain deficits in his argumentation are pointed out – above all, the absence of the Christological dimension of the consideration. After rejecting in detail the criticism directed at this consideration from the position of J.L. Mackie’s neo-positivism, the author concludes that Küng’s concept reconstructed here deserves further reflection, a further explanation of his approach to establishing faith in God, which would include certain modifications in line with the current discussion.
It is still controversial whether non-human animals are capable of knowledge, and, if so, of which kind of knowledge they are capable. In what follows we try to provide a tentative, concise contribution to these questions. Moving, of course, from a distinctively epistemological perspective, we consider three kinds of knowledge (knowledge by acquaintance, knowledge-how, propositional knowledge) and try to evaluate some circumstances under which non-human animal knowledge might be plausible.
This paper proposes a reconstruction of the stadium-argument against motion, one of the thorniest among Zeno’s arguments. The first step is the analysis of Aristotle’s explanation of Zeno’s paradox: this text is so cryptic and corrupted to constitute almost a mystery, both in itself and concerning the sense of the argument. After discussing the textual problems and the possible critical interpretations, a new reading of the topic at stake is attempted. Such a proposal fits within the framework of Zeno’s dialectics, whose ultimate meaning is to be found in the Eleatic metaphysics.
I will examine the status of the possibility of wisdom in Stoicism. In Stoic sources the possibility of wisdom seems to be presented in three ways. Of all these perspectives, the most interesting one seems to be the third. It seems to have been influenced by Stoic cosmology, rationalist and optimistic. Within this third perspective it is perhaps possible to trace the following development: a starting point represented by the distinction, attributed to Zeno, between two types of insipiens. This distinction was then formalized (probably by Chrysippus) through the distinction between the claim «Nemo est sapiens» and the claim «Nemo potest esse sapiens». A further step forward was taken with Diogenes of Babylon, according to whom it was not enough to state that some can really become wise: the possibility of wisdom, to be truly such, must have already been realized at least once (for the Principle of Plenitude).
The following article constitutes Part One one of a two-part inquiry into Thomas Aquinas’s theory of time perception, developed in his Aristotelian commentaries. It includes the introduction and first section, dealing with the principles of Thomas’s account, established in his discussion of the relation between time and motion in his commentary on Physics IV, c. 10-14. Part Two then deals with the psychology of time perception, divided into two sections. The first provides a detailed analysis of the roles of the common and proper senses, imagination or phantasia, and sense-consciousness in Thomas’s commentaries on the De sensu et sensato and De memoria et reminiscentia, arguing for a dynamic and multi-layered conception of phantasms. The second and final section then provides an illustration of Thomas’s theory of time perception by applying it to the analysis of three temporal phenomena: linguistic utterances, musical intervals, and sensible motions.
This paper presents Meister Eckhart’s metaphysical conception of love. In order to articulate his position, we offer an interpretation of what might be considered the core thesis of his doctrine, which can be summed up by the statement «Love is God». The interpretation of this particular position is articulated in two steps. In the first one, an explanation of the ontological framework sustaining Meister Eckhart’s conception of love is outlined. In the second step, the particular role that love plays in this conception is analyzed. The general position which emerges is an original view combining the Christian tradition with a particular form of monistic Platonism. In this context, love appears as the expression of the all-embracing dynamic of the transcendent divine principle.
Descartes’s ‘extravagant’ doctrine of the creation of eternal truths deploys a singular modal structure in which necessity and contingency, impossibility and possibility depend on divine choice. This article, based on the analysis of Cartesian texts, aims to draw a picture of the connection between divine freedom, the necessity of the laws of nature and the human knowledge of the eternal truths, to show that, through this doctrine, Descartes is interested in a correct view about God’s nature and power rather than in the construction of a general theory of modality.
In what follows, I will clarify why Hegel’s Encyclopaedia and Logic of Being (1832) assume a Kabbalistic interpretation of Spinozism. To introduce this reading of Spinoza’s ontology, I will discuss Jacobi’s Spinozabriefe and Maimon’s Lebensgeschichte, showing what the two Authors mean with Spinoza’s Kabbalism. For Jacobi, Spinoza’s nihilism is bound to the Kabbalistic principle ex nihilo nihil fit, which attributes Being to God and Non-being to finite things. For Maimon, Spinoza’s system has to be categorized as acosmistic (and not as atheistic), because it affirms – as Jewish Kabbalah – only God’s existence. Hegel’s use of these concepts suggests that he adopted the same interpretation sustained by Jacobi and Maimon: according to the principle ex nihilo nihil fit, Spinoza’s acosmistic system rejects the positive function of negativity within God’s undetermined being. The Kabbalisitc assumptions of Spinozism are those historical-philosophical elements, which hinder Spinoza to outline a dialectical conception of reality.
The idea of the «circulation of European thought» can be found in a certain way in the thought of both Silvio and Bertrando Spaventa. Since the 1840s Silvio has been critical of the idea that modern thought would be absent in Italy because of the lack of religious Reform, while at the same time identifying the idea of a mobility of European thought. Bertrando, instead, in the ’50 elaborates the theory of circulation first criticizing contemporary Italian thought, then – in the ’60 – tracing a line of continuity of modern thought that goes from Bruno to Gioberti, passing through the milestone of Hegelian paths. Both the brothers read the XVI Century Italian philosophy like the beginning of the modern thought, that starting to move from Italy to Europe has modernized the whole European philosophy.
This essay analyses texts written by Jean Starobinski between 1949 and 1953, which constitute the ethical-political laboratory for his reflections on the history of medicine and on the role of humanities in the face of modern science. This study is therefore intended to contribute to the critical debate arising around Starobinski’s work, but it will also be an opportunity to return to the way in which, during the post-World War II period, European intellectuals discussed the relationship between the language of science and that of the humanities.
The aim of this paper is to show the historical influence exercised by the so-called Brentano’s thesis. According to Brentano intentionality, i.e. the property of being about something or having content, is both necessary and sufficient condition of the mental: all and only mental phenomena exhibit intentionality. From this point of view, Brentano’s thesis responds to a cartesian, dualistic need, insofar as it tries to distinguish the mental from the physical. This idea, deepened by Husserl, is taken up by early analytic philosophy and becomes the ground of the intentionalist program, according to which the qualitative aspects of the mental have to be brought back to its intentional features. The review ends with some notes on Sellarsian adverbialism, pointing the way for future theoretical investigations on the role that this position has in contemporary reflection.
Through the reading of Feuerbach’s 1837 book dedicated to Leibniz, Bolzano grasp the opportunity to write in his philosophical diaries about the differences between Leibniz’s and his own views. This is an important document, as it provides us with a closer look at the relationship between such two great philosophers: while both signifacantly contributed to the very development of logic, in these pages Bolzano focuses rather on what divides them, particularly in the domain of ontology. His aim is to take up and redefine a monadological metaphysics and a speculative physics. This goal is mainly pursued by overcoming the theory of pre-established harmony.
The article discusses the studies, recently collected in a book, which are the result of Gianna Gigliotti’s long activity of research into a variety of themes of contemporary philosophy. These range from Kant’s concepts of the a priori and the transcendental to Cohen’s and Natorp’s interpretation of the Platonic doctrine of ideas, to the relationship between Neo-Kantianism and Phenomenology. The paper highlights, in particular, one of the main threads of Gigliotti’s research which is the reflection on the meaning of experience as a synthesis of phenomena. Focusing on the figure of Galilei and the path of thought that leads from Kant to Cohen and the Marburg School, Gigliotti identifies the characteristic features of Neo-Kantianism in the synthetic conception of experience and in the affirmation of the primacy of synthesis over intuition.
To read the complete works of Carlo Diano – the preparatory Notebooks, the whole hermeneutic exploration with its immense philological, philosophical, literary background – means to penetrate into the «secret» laboratory of the Author’s reflection, to find the tracks of his itinerary of thought in its auroral prefiguration, to rediscover the links with the European culture of his period. Moreover, this represents also a lesson that is still very topical, the lesson of a classic. In this essay, the focus is on some of Diano’s fundamental themes: form, event, time, periechon.
This paper revisits Luciano Floridi’s recent book Ethics of artificial intelligence in its two parts: the first is descriptive and attempts to explain why AI is not intelligent, whereas the second is evaluative-regulatory and contains the proposal for a kind of digital principlism, along with some recommendations and political norms designed to support social and climate wellbeing through AI. The paper concludes with some integrative and critical observations, specifically focused on three key aspects of Floridi’s arguments: his ethics, environmentalism, and anthropology, the last of which portrays an image of humans as both anomalous and transcendent beings.
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